



Reignite Multilateralism  
via Technology

## D4.1 Overview on current geopolitical stances of the EU, the US and China

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## Background of the REMIT project

The REMIT project aims to “**Reignite Multilateralism via Technology**”. A reigniting that not only reacts to China’s rise as a systemic technology rival or Russia’s resurgence as a technology abuser or the dominance of large U.S.-based digital platforms, but that sets a clear vision for the future — one in which Europe plays a leading role.

Coordinated by Maastricht University, the REMIT project brings together leading European researchers from nine partners from Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Romania and the United Kingdom. The goal is to develop recommendations, clear understanding of the status quo and innovative methodologies that support effective policies to revitalize global democratic structures.

REMIT aims to re-mobilize a transnational collective spirit that addresses global problems through technology, because

1. Technology has strong effect on economic competitiveness
2. Technology is important to national security including threats to democratic principles
3. Technology is crucial to the solutions for global challenges

By focusing on technology and the policy areas that emerge from the REMIT researchers’ expertise, the project provides the needed analysis and the theory building to support the EU. The four technology areas are also instrumental in finding solutions to all important challenges, including climate, digital transitions, the rise of inequalities, ageing and disabilities, migrations, health pandemics, and information disorder. Ultimately, REMIT intends to design policy recommendations that will give a remit to reignite multilateralism via technology.

The detailed objectives of the REMIT project are:

» **Objective 1:** To define the EU’s role in leading the renewal and defence of multilateralism starting with the global governance of technologies in four crucial policy areas (digital, health bio, security and defence, and financial technologies). The lack of comprehensive, multilateral tech regulations represents material national security threats to the EU and its allies by allowing others (especially China) to set the rules for the digital future.

» **Objective 2:** To provide evidence-based advice to reinforce European institutions in the field of technology that work and propose innovative, multilateral-governance constructs for those that do not.

» **Objective 3:** To develop policy recommendations and scenario testing workshops offered to relevant EU administrators, important regional groups, and national officials.

» **Objective 4:** To share knowledge among stakeholders and to communicate policy recommendations. REMIT will recommend policy action for the European Union that further re-conceptualizes multilateralism in the four technology areas.

The REMIT project is carried out from March 2023 until February 2027 and has a total budget of almost €3 million, of which €2.6 million is funded by the EU’s Horizon Europe research and innovation program and €370k is provided by the UK government through the UK Research and Innovation fund (UKRI). The project is being carried out by internationally recognized researchers from Maastricht University, Universitatea Babeş Bolyai, Universitaet Bremen, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Luiss Libera Universita Internazionale Degli Studi Sociali Guido Carli, Erasmus University Rotterdam, the Finnish Institute for International Affairs and the University of Tartu. In addition, the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative (ECCRI) joins the consortium as an associate partner, receiving funding from UKRI.



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## List of Abbreviations and Definitions

Abbreviation	Definition
ACF	Advocacy Coalition Framework
AI	Artificial Intelligence
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
CCW	Certain Conventional Weapons
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CFO	Chief Financial Officer
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease 2019
DNA	Discourse Network Analysis
E-ARC	Euro-Atlantic Center for Resilience
ECCRI	European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative
EDF	European Defence Fund
EU	European Union
EUR	Erasmus University Rotterdam
EUXGLOB	Centre for the Study of the European Union's External Relations and Global Order
EV	Electronic vehicle
FIIA	Finnish Institute of International Affairs
HGGE	Human Genome Germline Editing
IRDC	International Relations & Diplomacy Committee
ISA	International Studies Association
LUISS	LUISS Guido Carli



MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MIIT	Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
mRNA	Messenger RNA
MVNIA	Mihail Viteazul National Intelligence Academy
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIG	Netherlands Institute of Governance
PESCO	Permanent Structured Cooperation
PI	Principal Investigator
QCA	Qualitative Comparative Analysis
REAIM	Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain
R&D	Research and Development
SCS	South China Sea
SNA	Social Network Analysis
STI	Science, Technology & Innovation
TTC	Trade and Technology Council
UBB	Babeş-Bolyai University
UM	Maastricht University
UN	United Nations
US	United States
VUD Brussels	Vrije Universiteit Brussels
WP	Work Package



# Executive Summary

WP4 research has contributed to the broader aim of REMIT, exploring ways of reinvigorating multilateral cooperation on technologies in times of strategic competition. This work has been instructed both ideationally and prescriptively by the scholarship of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) that in recent years have been extended to foreign policy research. WP4 researchers from five different partner institutions have, with their separate and joint research, contributed to a state-of-the-art review employing a broad range of research methods on the stances of the EU, the United States and China on geopolitics in technology governance. The policy-oriented work along with the incipient academic research suggests that the EU must double down on strategic multilateralism. For the Union to cope with, or even instrumentalise, the US-China rivalry that has shifted from mutual reassurance to deterrence, EU policy makers must flexibly choose international forums – a combination of bi-, mini-, or multilateral ones— which allow for the pursuit of the Union’s values and interests rather than focusing on global dialogue as a value in itself. Like-minded partners are central in this endeavour, especially the United States along with the United Kingdom and other Western partners. Attention must also be paid to cooperation with countries of the so-called Global South, in addition to which the Union must not forsake multilateral forums and adapting traditional approaches or existing treaties to account for new technologies, such as dealing with automated weapons system through the Convention on Conventional Weapons or upholding the norms of international humanitarian law. The analyses of WP4 on geopolitics in technology governance will in the future be developed further within two special issues in prestigious academic journals on governance and advocacy.

## 1. Introduction: Work Package 4 - Geopolitics and Technology Governance

In a world rapidly shaped by technological advancements, there is an urgent need to harness the power of technological innovation, while upholding the principles of multilateralism and global governance. REMIT’s goal is to help transform the EU’s role in global governance and cooperation in the digital age. This means going beyond reacting to China’s rise as a systemic technology rival, Russia’s resurgence as a technology abuser or the dominance of large US-based digital platforms. Indeed, REMIT seeks to contribute to a vision for the future in which Europe plays a leading role with its most important partners in the technology-geopolitics space.

With a global focus, Work Package 4 (WP4) aims to understand the current geopolitical stances of the EU, the US and China in four different areas of technology governance (digital; health bio; security and defence; and financial services). In Task 4.1., researchers in WP4 have undertaken a state-of-the-art review that defines the roles of the key nation states (EU, US, and China) and the main multilateral institutions. WP4 has further investigated the geopolitical stances of these key entities, considering major geopolitical factors, such as the rise of new or re-emerging powers and on-going shifts in dominance in some tech sectors. For Task 4.1., WP4 has employed a mix of normative and empirical methodologies for gathering pertinent information for analysis. These have included, for instance, systematic literature reviews, interviews and consultations, survey research, quantitative content analysis and social network analysis applied to specific policy subsystems. Data generated by WP4 this year supports research for Task 4.2. to be carried out in year two, which will focus on using the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to map coalitions, identify coalition members, their belief systems, their policy stances and their strategies implemented to assist policy preference adoption. In moving forward with the future tasks, the WP researchers will constantly be mindful of potential major changes in the strategies of major key powers and any developments taking place in international forums.

## 2. Description of Activities

The work of WP4 with respect to Task 4.1. has included in-person and virtual meetings amongst work package researchers, employing or starting preparatory work for the employment of key methods with a particular focus on the requirements of the Advocacy Coalition Framework, the publication of



academic journal article(s), op-eds and policy briefs, along with outreach to academic and policymaking communities as well as the broader public (for full list of activities for WP4, see Annex I).

In addition, WP4 has begun preparatory work on two special issues in anticipation of fulfilling Tasks 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4, to be completed in the coming years and relating to the analysis of policy subsystems relevant to ACF, identifying barriers and opportunities to improve multilateral-governance, and ultimately offering policy recommendations that go beyond state-of-the-art.

## 2.1. Organisation of work

Following the REMIT project kick-off meeting in Maastricht in March 2023, it was agreed to arrange an in-person meeting in Helsinki, Finland, 8 to 9 June 2023 for the whole of WP4. The aim was to ponder together the research path to be taken, discuss the ACF framework and explore synergies between the various partner institutions in the conduct of the research tasks.

All partner institutions with 16 researchers altogether were represented at the two-day meeting. Based on a roadmap presented by FIIA, extensive discussions and guidance by the REMIT project PI Roberta Haar, the partners agreed upon how to advance in the first year of the project. The fruitful meeting generated joint research endeavours between various partners, allowed for constructive discussion on how to approach the ACF, and with future deliverables in mind, set the scene for the decision to engage in the production of two special issues in academic journals. It was decided that one would focus on geopolitics, the other on the ACF and strategic technologies (see below section 2.5).

Following the physical get-together in Helsinki, regular online meetings have been arranged on the following dates: 7 September 2023, 6 October 2023, 27 November 2023 and 5 February 2024. Various matters have been discussed, such as the research and dissemination activities of the partner institutions, the arrangement of different events, and how to construct the first WP deliverable. The meetings have also provided the researchers with opportunities to discuss challenges and share best practices.

## 2.2. Methods

In accordance with the grant agreement and the tasks enlisted for WP4, a broad variety of methods have been used to conduct the relevant research. The varying research methods and skills of the WP4 researchers have been brought together with both quantitative and qualitative foci, with overall emphasis on the latter. The broader framework for the whole REMIT-project—the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF)—also instructs the research conducted by WP4. Below will follow first a short description of the overall framework, followed by the multi-dimensional research methods employed, and how they play in.

### 2.2.1. Advocacy Coalition Framework

The ACF is a framework primarily used in political science and policy analysis, with its application expanding to the study of international relations more recently. Paul A. Sabatier and Christopher M. Weible developed the ACF to consider policy questions that involve substantial goal conflicts and multiple actors from several levels of government.<sup>1</sup> The framework emphasizes the importance of coalition formations and learning from policies over time in shaping policy outcomes. It specifically highlights the creation of advocacy coalitions, which are groups of individuals and organizations sharing common beliefs and policy preferences. The interactions and dynamics within these coalitions play a critical role in influencing the process of policy change. Over the years, the ACF framework has proved applicable to many policy subsystems, including the defence and foreign policy domain.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Sabatier and Weible 2007.

<sup>2</sup> Pierce et al. 2017; Weible et al. 2009; Weible et al. 2011.





In WP4, the ACF and how to apply its “ideal four-step approach”,<sup>3</sup> has been discussed both constructively and critically in physical meetings, in connection to development of the project’s Methodological Handbook,<sup>4</sup> as well as in training sessions. WP4 researchers have utilized the ACF both as an ideational background on how to think about their research and/or as a predetermined model for how to conduct research. The former *modus operandi* was steering the research of several joint WP4 research papers exploring the EU and AI governance; the latter is exemplified by the work of particularly UM in topics such as US foreign policy making environment and multilateral security operations with European partners and understanding the differing groups within US foreign policymaking and their conflicting views on multilateralism and China. The ACF also features prominently in the two special issues that are being worked on, especially in the one targeting the *Forum* of the *International Studies Review*.

### 2.2.2. Employed Methods

The expertise of the WP lies with geopolitics and multilateral cooperation rather than expertise in different technology sectors. To improve the understanding of various technologies, technology one-papers were drafted in the whole project, to enable WP4 researchers to grasp the current-state of affairs on technologies as pertains to, inter alia, relevant forums, possible regulation and current developments.

*Qualitative research methods*, entailing document and systematic literature review are at the heart of the research already materialized as well as future research within WP4. Systematic literature review is one the main data collection methods for the WP4 researchers, including researchers from EUR, FIIA, LUISS, UBB and UM. Document analysis will serve for investigating core beliefs, stakeholders and development trajectories in the various sectors of technology, for example fintech, but also on security and defence technology. Also, review of governance initiatives, legislative and regulatory acts from various countries, organizations or conglomerates have been explored to shed light on the existing regime complex bearing the state-of-the-art review in mind.

As research design, *case-studies* on the major powers are widely used in WP4 as geopolitics forms its core. Besides single case-studies, also comparative or even multiple case-studies will be relied on. Comparative case studies have been utilized within fintech policies, as well as in bio and health tech – often between the major political powers of the EU, China and the US (and sometimes Russia)— to grasp the difference among them, as well as explore alternative ways of how to govern challenges in technology. In the long run, this will contribute to the provision of a thorough and credible justification for policy changes and global governance.

*Interviews and consultations* with senior diplomats, officials and experts with relevant expertise from Europe, Washington D.C. and several other countries was another method employed by WP4 researchers. Especially the contacts in Washington D.C. were made possible by the members of REMIT’s Advisory Board. Both unstructured and semi-structured interviews were used by WP4 researchers, for example, in the field of security and defence technology, but also in the field of bio and health technology. The generated data will complement the primary findings of the scholarly work being conducted. The interviews were conducted with relevant ethics clearance.

*Survey research*, which entails collecting information from a sample of individuals through their responses to questions, was in accordance with the grant agreement and expertise of the partners conducted by EUR in mapping military AI policy and governance preferences. To understand how the EU should direct its efforts in global governance of military AI, an online survey was administered to experts specialising in the field of military AI. The survey was conducted between 24 October and 23 November 2023, targeting researchers with expertise in European defence and military policy. In total, 2,996 individuals were approached, of whom 479 responded, achieving a response rate of 15.98%.<sup>5</sup> One

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<sup>3</sup> Weible et al. 2019, p. 6.

<sup>4</sup> See REMIT Deliverable 2.1.

<sup>5</sup> A diverse set of sources was used to compile the list of experts for this survey:

1) experts registered in the Confederation of Laboratories for Artificial Intelligence Research in Europe (CLAIRE);



segment of the survey focused on gathering expert opinions regarding their preferences about the degree and breadth of the EU's involvement in regulating military AI on a global scale. These inquiries sought opinions on the EU's willingness and capability to take a leading role in military AI regulation as well as prioritization matters. Additionally, the survey included questions about the stakeholders and actors that the Union should consider, and the format in which cooperative endeavours should take place.

Based on the survey, EUR was tasked in the execution of the project to conduct a *Social Network Analysis* (SNA) focusing on relevant actors in the governance of military AI in Europe. To achieve this objective, EUR utilized data obtained from the above-mentioned survey of nearly 3000 AI experts in Europe. The survey sought two types of data suitable for analysis: state-level data (inquiring about the closest partners for the states within respondents' expertise) and individual-level data (inquiring about respondents' closest partners). The response rate for the latter was unfortunately insufficient for a reliable and valid analysis, which presumably is due to the sensitivity of the asked information leading to too low a number of meaningful responses. However, EUR received an adequate number of responses for the former. Elements of this data have been incorporated into a working paper, co-authored with FIIA, published 13 February 2024. In the publication, measures of centrality to estimate the most significant partners for European countries are leveraged. Furthermore, EUR is contemplating the inclusion of a topographical depiction of partnerships among states in a paper currently under preparation for submission to a peer-reviewed journal. This paper aims to present the comprehensive results of the survey.

*Discourse Network Analysis* (DNA), which combines qualitative content analysis and network analysis, is used by researchers at UM to delve into China's technology policy. This method focuses on the affiliations between political actors and the concepts they mention in speeches, and the relations among actors and concepts themselves across time. UM researchers have collected over 900 documents in Chinese from the country's media related to China's official attitudes towards global technology governance from news media, official journals, and official books between 2013 and 2023. A coding process, whose unit of coding is a statement, is on-going with the aim to sort out the different focuses on technology of different departments.

Future work of WP4 researchers from UM may also involve *Qualitative Comparative Analysis* (QCA), a set-based theory that seeks to explain the relationship between causal conditions and outcomes through the concept of sets and their relations. The research aim related to QCA is to compare China's changing technology policies in different topical scopes and geographical scopes, and then try to figure out from an ACF perspective, if China's decision-making process regarding different tech sub-systems has similarities or distinctions. The QCA is normally applicable to the middle-N cases.<sup>6</sup>

*Quantitative content analysis* and *coding* is a central method employed by the researchers in the application of the ACF, particularly at UM. Structural coding is employed to capture which individuals in the foreign policy subsystem being examined belong to each of the coalitions. Value coding is utilized to capture their worldviews (including deep core, policy core and secondary core beliefs). Expressions of worldviews are gleaned from a news media and document analyses and coded via a standardized

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2) researchers based at the 251 European research institutions highlighted in the 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index (GGTI);

3) researchers from the top 50 European universities in the 2023 QS World University Rankings for Politics;

4) authors or academics who published on military AI, specifically emphasising the European Union or other European countries;

5) speakers in the 2023 REAIM Summit and

6) active individual users of X (formerly Twitter) who created original content about military AI within the European Union between 2021 and 2023.

<sup>6</sup> The term 'middle N-cases' refers to an optimal range of cases for conducting QCA, ensuring a balance between analytical depth and breadth. This range, typically between 10 to 80 cases, allows researchers to perform detailed comparative studies without overwhelming the analysis with too many cases, maintaining a focus on qualitative distinctions and patterns across policy subsystems.



approach,<sup>7</sup> that aligns with a detailed codebook.<sup>8</sup> Searches using the *LexisNexis* database with a focus on reputable news outlets in both the United States and Europe (*The New York Times* and *The Financial Times*), along with congressional committee hearings, generated relevant expressions by members of Congress. Additionally, manuscripts written about key coalition members during the timeframe, including autobiographies and biographies, are incorporated as supplementary primary materials. This multidimensional data collection approach enhances the comprehensiveness and robustness of the research findings. A team did the coding to ensure greater objectivity.

### 2.3. Research Output

In pursuit of the objectives for Task 4.1. both academic and policy-oriented research was conducted ranging from general global governance questions to the competitive constellation between the great powers and specific sectors of technology. The **research output** covers: **1 published academic journal article, 1 unpublished academic journal article, 1 working paper, 4 policy briefs, and 3 opinion pieces.** They tie into the five streams of empirical analysis envisaged for WP4, namely 1) differing advocacy coalitions within the US where governmental and non-governmental actors influence US foreign policy and its approaches to multilateralism; 2) tensions in transatlantic cooperation and European strategic autonomy in technology governance; 3) the ability of advocacy coalitions within the EU to manage the digital transformation; 4) policy preferences developed within the EU's regional groupings including the Nordic-Baltic region and the Black Sea region; and 5) key policy subsystems comparing the US, EU and China, including advanced security and defence technologies; surveillance technologies; bio health technologies; and Science, Technology & Innovation (STI) policies. The presentation below is categorised according to broader themes due to the cross-cutting nature of the researched topics.

To start with, the overall *decline in multilateral cooperation* in general,<sup>9</sup> along with the deterioration of the European security situation, and consequential competitive setting of great power relations formed a part of the research performed by WP4. These dynamics also impact regional constellations within the EU in different ways. Particular attention was paid to the Union's Eastern and Northern parts in accordance with WP4's ambitions, as the current situation will affect regional policy preferences in terms of whom to liaise with on global governance matters in general, and technology in particular. These aspects of the international political landscape were explored in UBB's **policy brief** by Valentin Naumescu entitled "The Global Actors and the Black Seas's Geopolitics in the Context of the War of Ukraine"; and Eoin McNamara's (FIIA) two **opinion pieces** "Finland's Hard Road to NATO", and "Damaged Baltic Sea Pipeline Signals More Doubts for Europe's Maritime Security". The common denominator for these publications lies with analyses on the threat that Russia with its aggression against Ukraine, including its partnership with China, poses for the overall security of EU member states and their critical infrastructure, as exemplified by the downing of the Balticconnector and damage to undersea telecommunications cables. They investigate respectively how the EU should advance with respect to the Black Sea region, in addition to exploring pertinent NATO structures as crucial to European economic and technological connectivity.

WP4 research also focused on existing *global governance models* from sectorally close regimes to examine, such as arms control and nuclear energy, whether lessons learned can be transposed to the discussion on how to arrange the governance of critical technologies. In his **Briefing Paper** "Nuclear Arms Control Policies and Safety in AI: Transferrable Lessons or False Equivalence?" FIIA researcher Eoin McNamara explored whether nuclear arms control policies can serve as an inspiration for ensuring safety in AI. McNamara's research investigates stakeholderhood, pertinent concepts and whether reciprocal risk reduction can serve as a helpful logic also in AI governance.

In line with one of the prescribed foci of the work package, *US foreign policy* and its approaches to multilateralism was researched by UM's Roberta Haar in a yet **unpublished academic article**. She explores the United States' geopolitical stance towards multilateralism throughout the postwar era. Mapping this historical overview is important because understanding the evolution of the United States'

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<sup>7</sup> Heikkilä, Berardo, Weible and Yi 2019.

<sup>8</sup> See REMIT Deliverable 2.1 "REMIT's Methodological handbook".

<sup>9</sup> Borrell 2023; Jokela et al. 2023.



policy on multilateralism has significance for global affairs—related to US economic, political, and cultural power, and America’s role in addressing global challenges. Shifts in US multilateral policies can have far-reaching consequences for international relations, global governance, and the ability to tackle collectively pressing global issues.

Most research outputs within the work package nevertheless devoted attention to the *EU* and how the Union can master great power rivalry in tech governance, both in general and with respect to the policy subsystem of AI in particular. Flavia Lucenti’s and Thomas Christiansen’s **policy brief** “Geopolitical Rivalry and the Regulation of Strategic Technologies: What Role for the European Union?” explored the role of the European Union in the regulation of strategic technologies, and the question of whether the EU is falling behind other powers.<sup>10</sup> Their analysis centres on normative power and industrial bases, whereas UM’s Roberta Haar and Hengyi Yang focus on the US-China tech rivalry and its implications for Europe in their **policy brief**, “What should Europeans do about the U.S.-China Rivalry in key strategic technologies?”. In-depth research into the role of EU and its potential coalition partners in (military) AI governance was presented by Katja Creutz (FIIA), Mahmoud Javadi (EUR), Michal Onderco (EUR) and Ville Sinkkonen (FIIA) in “The EU and Military AI Governance: Forging Value-based Coalitions in an Age of Strategic Competition”. Their **working paper** based on an expert survey features discussion on EU’s ability to forge coalitions, which countries have similar interests and values, and eventually how to move forward in terms of governance. Michal Onderco and Mahmoud Javadi also analysed the transatlantic overlapping but divergent initiatives in military applications of AI in a separate **opinion piece** “What Does Military AI Governance Need”.

Finally, the first **published academic article** authored by UM Catherine Yuk-ping Lo together with Remco Johan Leonard van Dijk focused on *China* and its usage of mRNA technology as a soft power instrument by way of so-called vaccine diplomacy. The article entitled “The Effect of Chinese Vaccine Diplomacy during Covid-19 in the Philippines and Vietnam: A Multiple Case Study from a Soft Power Perspective” conducts a comparative case exploring the Philippines and Vietnam.

## 2.4. Outreach

The Geopolitics and Technology Governance- work package has undertaken various public outreach activities in the past year, with the aim of disseminating the research and analysis of the REMIT project to academics, the broader policy community, as well as students at respective institutions and the interested public. In total, **3 public events were organised by different partners, 1 workshop was arranged along with 1 conference panel.**

Roberta Haar (UM) co-organised a **panel** with Wolfgang Wagner (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam) at the NIG (Netherlands Institute of Governance) Annual Work Conference on 2 and 3 November 2023 at Delft University. On the panel, REMIT researcher Mahmoud Javadi (EUR) and his REMIT co-authors Michal Onderco (EUR) and Sophie Vanhoonacker (UM) discussed their paper entitled “Can the European Union be an actor in regulating the military AI governance”. Haar (UM) also presented her work on “Employing the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to explain Obama’s shift in his policy of Multilateralism”.

The UBB REMIT Team organized a public event in the form of a **round table discussion** on the Geopolitics and the impact of new technologies in the Black Sea region at the third edition of EUXGLOB III International Conference – Perspectives of the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood on 9 November 2023. The event was chaired by REMIT researcher Valentin Naumescu (UBB) and included a presentation by Oana Poiană Marchis (UBB). The roundtable engaged nine experts from different fields to provide insight from their work in academia, the military or government, on the challenges and opportunities presented by the emergence of new technologies in the Black Sea region. Experts presented diverse institutions including the Euro-Atlantic Center for Resilience (E-ARC), the Irregular Warfare Initiative, the European Cybersecurity Competence Centre Governing Board, the Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy (MVNIA), the Nicolae Bălcescu Land Forces Academy, Lucian Blaga University Sibiu, National Institute for Aerospace Research Elie Carafoli, and the US Military Delegation to the NATO Military Committee.

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<sup>10</sup> This policy brief counts formally as a REMIT WP5 dissemination activity, but due to its two-pronged theme, it is highly relevant for WP4 as well, and hence included in this deliverable and its findings.



During their presentations the experts addressed the challenges at global, regional, and national levels - stressing Romania's responses to the current war in Ukraine, hybrid warfare, the use of drones, cybersecurity as well as the involvement of the academia in the shaping of new generations of experts alongside involvement in the civil society to combat the spread of disinformation or the phenomenon of fake news. To broaden the audience of the event, the Round Table had a zoom link that could be accessed by all participants in the EUXGLOB event.

Researchers also gathered for a **workshop** on The Geopolitics of Technology Governance at Luiss Guido Carli in Rome on 22 November 2023 to present on-going work. The event included presentations by REMIT researchers Thomas Christiansen (LUISS), Sophie Vanhoonacker (UM), Ville Sinkkonen (FIIA), Catherine Yuk-ping Lo (UM), Hengyi Yang (UM), Flavia Lucenti (LUISS) and Carolina Polito (LUISS), as well as other invited experts from FIIA, LUISS, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, University of Potsdam, and University of Bologna. Themes addressed included the views of key powers (US, China, EU) and other relevant actors (East Asian states, India, Russia) on technology governance as well as the role these actors play in the governance of technologies in institutional fora and key regions (e.g. Africa).

FIIA held a **public townhall event** in Helsinki on 24 January 2024, with Katja Creutz (FIIA), Michal Onderco (EUR) and Ville Sinkkonen (FIIA) on "Governing Military AI in competitive times: Options for the EU". Participants to the event included, inter alia, students, members of parliament, university researchers, and retired civil servants. The event drew on their FIIA Working Paper published on 13 February 2024, and addressed how the EU should position itself in and among various governance and regulatory efforts aimed at military applications of AI, building on an extensive AI expert survey conducted by Erasmus University Rotterdam in autumn 2023. In particular, the seminar addressed the EU's coalition-building willingness, whom to liaise with, and how the EU can situate itself in a global landscape where a multitude of initiatives are being set forth.

Maastricht University will host a **public event** on 29 February 2024 in partnership with Studio Europa Maastricht, the International Relations & Diplomacy Committee (IRDC) at University College Maastricht and the Maastricht University debating association Eloquentia around the topic "Multilateralism and the Transatlantic Relationship." It includes a speech writing workshop and competition and panel discussion with Bram Boxhoorn and Professor Giles Scott-Smith on their book *The Transatlantic Era (1989-2020)* in Document and Speeches. Professor Roberta Haar (UM) will open the event with introductory remarks on Multilateralism and the Transatlantic Relationship, with a focus on the role of technology. She will then moderate a discussion with Bram Boxhoorn and Professor Scott-Smith that highlights the multilateralism/global governance aspect of the Transatlantic Relationship. After the discussion, the panellists will act as judges in a speech competition. One week in advance (21 February), a workshop on public speaking was offered. On the 29th, students who participated in the workshop will present speeches after the panel in a speech competition. Because of audience demand, the program took place in the largest lecture hall at Maastricht University, the Franz Palm lecture hall at the School of Economics and Business.

The REMIT project's objective to visualize its research findings via **monitors or dashboard** runs throughout the project. The first WP4 dashboards/ monitors are scheduled to appear in Spring 2024 as the consortium has worked out which software to use and in what ways it would be most productive to present research data and results. WP6 has undertaken efforts to provide further insights into how to best construct monitors/dashboards by arranging joint sessions and by hiring extra resources to manage their realization with the programme *Tableau*.

## 2.5. Parallel Work: Preparations for Future Deliverables

The REMIT researchers in WP4 are working on putting together a **special issue** entitled *The Geopolitics of Strategic Technology Governance* for the journal *Geopolitics* and the **forum section** for International Studies Review called *The Advocacy Coalition Framework: A New Approach for Understanding Global Governance of Technology*. The special issue will be guest edited by REMIT researchers Thomas Christiansen (LUISS), Ville Sinkkonen (FIIA) and Sophie Vanhoonacker (UM), and the forum co-authored by Catherine Yuk-ping Lo (UM), Michal Onderco (EUR), Mahmoud Javadi (EUR), Carolina Polito (LUISS), Max Smeets (ECCRI), Siyuan Qiao (UM). Both undertakings will be presented and discussed at the upcoming REMIT annual conference in Leuven, 16–17 May 2024.



### 2.5.1. Special Issue Synopsis: The Geopolitics of Strategic Technology Governance (*Geopolitics* journal)

The special issue explores the way the main geopolitical actors approach the **governance of civilian and military applications in key technology sectors** such as digital, health and bio- technologies, both separately and in relation to one another. The special issue will bring together contributions that focus on the key geopolitical actors and arenas, while also exploring their activities across a range of critical tech sectors. In this regard, the various papers will explore developments in areas such as civilian AI, digital services, quantum computing, 5G/6G infrastructure, microchips, biometric and surveillance technologies as well as cybersecurity and lethal autonomous weapons.

In analysing developments about these strategic technologies, the special issue will approach the topic in two ways: first, the focus is on a **triangle of key powers** – the United States, China and the European Union – that play a central role in the governance of strategic technologies, whether assessed in terms of technological capabilities, innovative potential, or regulatory capacity. The interplay among these three actors, as well as dynamics of political contestation within them, look set to define how technology will be understood, framed, and utilized in global politics in the coming decades. On the other hand, the special issue takes stock of how **other states** (India, Russia, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan) and global regions (East Asia, Africa) as well as the **relevant international organizations** relate to developments in these domains. Given the complexities of geopolitical competition and multilateral cooperation concerning strategic technologies, the interactions between the US, China and the EU, and with other powers, in both regional and global fora, are seen as critical in the way in which contests over technological innovation, attempts at de-risking or efforts towards regulation unfold.

Beyond **eight substantive articles** devoted to these major powers, key actors and global regions, the special issue will also comprise a **final article reflecting on the findings** of the various contributions and their significance for global governance, as well as an **introductory article** that will set the scene, identify the main research questions, frame the approach to the topic and introduce the individual articles.

The contributions to the special issue approach the study of the geopolitics of strategic technology governance from a **constructivist perspective and also employing the ACF where feasible**. This implies a focus on the processes that inform the construction of geopolitical rivalries and alliances, on the linkages that are being established between political power, regulatory activity and technological progress, on the perceptions that actors develop on questions such as threats or status through inter-state and transnational relations, and the manner in which identities and interests are constructed in and through the (geo)political competition and cooperation in strategic technologies.

As the Table of Contents below illustrates, most of the research for the proposed special issue is being carried out by REMIT researchers, with scholars from other projects and institutions having joined the group in view of their specific expertise.

#### Contents of the special issue

1. “The Geopolitics of Strategic Technology Governance: Setting the Scene”  
*Thomas Christiansen (LUISS), Ville Sinkkonen (FIIA) and Sophie Vanhoonacker (UM)*
2. “The United States and Strategic Technology Governance: Domestic Coalitions, Foreign Policy and Multilateral Cooperation”  
*Roberta N. Haar (UM) and Ville Sinkkonen (FIIA)*
3. “China’s Geopolitical Position and Strategy in Global Technology Governance”  
*Catherine Yuk-ping Lo (UM) and Hengyi Yang (UM)*
4. “The European Union’ Approach to Governance of Strategic Technologies: Between Geopolitical Competition and Multilateral Cooperation”  
*Thomas Christiansen (LUISS), Flavia Lucenti (LUISS) and Sophie Vanhoonacker (UM)*
5. “Strategic Technology Governance in East Asia”  
*Giulia Tercovich (VUD Brussels)*
6. “Status-Seeking in a Digital World: Technology Governance, Geopolitics, and Indian Foreign Policy”  
*Sharinee L. Jagtiani (University of Potsdam)*



7. “Russia’s Cyber Sovereignty Strategy and Its Vulnerabilities in the Wake of the War of Aggression in Ukraine”  
*Flavia Lucenti (LUISS) and Sinikukka Saari (FIIA)*
8. “Technology Export to Africa: A Critical Discourse Analysis”  
*Carolina Polito (LUISS)*
9. “The Geopoliticization of International Organizations and Strategic Technologies: Restructuring the Global Balance of Power through Institutions”  
*Bachir Azzam (UM) and Hylke Dijkstra (UM)*
10. “The Geopolitics of Strategic Technology Governance: Reflections and Future Perspectives”  
*Kathleen R. McNamara (Georgetown University)*

### Authors’ workshops

Funding available through REMIT supports the organisation of **two authors’ workshops**. The first of these was held in at **Luiss Guido Carli in Rome** on 22 November 2023. The event included presentations by the guest editors and contributors on the topics of their papers, followed by feedback from and discussion with the audience, which consisted of the contributors and invited guests from LUISS, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and the University of Bologna. The event was also used to agree on next steps, including a provisional schedule for completing the submission of the special issue to the journal (see below).

The authors of the special issue will meet again during a side event to be arranged at the **ISA 2024 Annual Convention in San Francisco** on 6 April 2024 to present draft papers. The event will allow the special issue editors to discuss problems they might encounter or aspects that need clarification. The workshop will ensure that the final special issue is one coherent publishing project, even if the articles are submitted and reviewed separately per journal policies. Each paper will be allocated a discussant from the team of authors. The discussants will also provide the presenters with written feedback.

### Provisional schedule

22 November 2023	Presentation of initial ideas for papers and discussion of overall conceptual framing at authors’ workshop in Rome
31 January 2024	Draft introductory paper outlining key questions and analytical frame circulated to all contributors
31 March 2024	Submission of full drafts of all contributing papers and circulation to all workshop participants
6 April 2024	Presentation and discussion of draft papers at second authors’ workshop (as well as at various ISA panels) in San Francisco
31 August 2024	Submission of revised papers by all contributors to guest editors
September 2024	Final revisions and preparation of manuscript for formal submission to journal
1 October 2024	Submission of complete manuscript to the editors of <i>Geopolitics</i> for peer review
Jan/Feb 2025	Publication of special issue following double-blind peer review

### 2.5.2. *The Forum* Synopsis:<sup>11</sup> The Advocacy Coalition Framework – A New Approach for Understanding Global Governance of Technology (*International Studies Review*)

In recent years, international relations scholars have paid increased attention to the growing importance of emerging technologies in international relations. However, comparatively less attention has been paid to understanding how the rules governing specific technological applications come about. The rising number and power of transnational partnerships in global technological governance have prompted greater attention to who makes these rules and regulations, how this happens, and with what effects.

In this Forum, six REMIT researchers propose to use Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) as one of the most widely applied conceptual frameworks to comprehend domestic public policy processes. The ACF

<sup>11</sup> *The Forum* is a channel of the *International Studies Review* for debating e.g. “concepts, theories, methods, and the state of current research...”. Wiley n.d.



focuses on explaining how policy change occurs when there is a conflict concerning goals and technical approaches among different coalitions of actors. Since the application of the ACF has recently transcended from domestic to foreign policies, we propose the ACF as a novel conceptual framework for understanding the global governance of technologies.

**With the application of the ACF, the proposal examines the stances of key technological and geopolitical players**, such as the US, EU, and China, on the governance of five technological domains, including military application of artificial intelligence, biometric technology and facial recognition systems, cyberwarfare, health bio, and blockchain and cryptocurrency. In this Forum, each article focuses on one specific domain of emerging technologies and investigates the issue of governance on both national and international agendas, examining how analysing individual stakeholders, their preferences and coalitions can help us to understand governance dynamics.

Overall, the Forum brings together academics with diverse investigative agendas to understand the conceptual, methodological, and ethical issues stemming from the global governance of technologies. What ties these contributions together is the use of ACF to understand policy development and its underlying shifts. This approach allows us to **identify the actors involved in technological policy formulation and discern the specific drivers of these changes**. The findings will shed some light on the challenges, search for tangible solutions, and prospects for governing emerging technologies globally.

#### List of contributors and themes of forum contributions

1. Policy entrepreneurs and Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence (AI)  
*Michal Onderco (EUR) and Mahmoud Javadi (EUR)*
2. Policy coalitions in the regulation of Facial Recognition Technologies  
*Carolina Polito (LUISS)*
3. Policy coalitions in the US Cyber Command  
*Max Smeets (ECCRI)*
4. Policy coalitions in the global governance of HGGE (Human Genome Germline Editing) technologies  
*Catherine Yuk-ping Lo (UM)*
5. Beliefs and policy coalition dynamics relevant to blockchain applications in the financial sector  
*Siyuan Qiao (UM)*

#### Provisional schedule

June 2024                      Planned submission date for the forum to International Studies Review

### 3. Results: State-of-the-art Review

Specifically, the work undertaken by **WP4 has zeroed in on the current geopolitical stances and worldviews of the EU, the US and China** towards four policy areas (*digital, health bio, security and defence, and financial*). The emphasis placed on these technologies has varied across the different actors, yet the work of researchers in Task 4.1. will ultimately allow for the extrapolation of their results to the coalition-building dynamics that will be explored in Task 4.2. (during the second year of the project) with respect to all three key powers.

#### 3.1 The EU's Role in the Governance of Strategic Technologies in an Age of Geopolitical Rivalry

In Europe, the discourse on strategic technologies is very much centred on how the Union and its member states should navigate a global tech space dominated by two superpowers, the United States and China, which increasingly fail to see eye-to-eye on questions of global governance and how to operate in a world of big tech. The models put forth by these two behemoths – a market-based approach and a state-based one – are often pitted against a **European third way, namely active regulation**.<sup>12</sup> It

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<sup>12</sup> Bradford 2023.





remains debatable, however, to what extent the Union has the requisite capabilities to pursue its values and interests in the tech space, given that it lags behind the US and China in innovation, and it is **not a unitary actor in all sectors relevant to navigating strategic technologies** in the coming decades. The research undertaken by REMIT researchers in Task 4.1. on the role of the EU in strategic technology governance zeroes in on the challenges posed by these dynamics.

### 3.1.1. The Possibilities and Limits of Normative Power Europe

Recent discussion on the EU's "Brussels Effect" – a global standardisation process that comes about passively through unilateral regulatory actions taken by the European Union, which then come to be projected beyond its borders through market mechanisms – harkens back to much older debates on the **European Union as a normative or even civilian power**.<sup>13</sup> In these discussions, the EU has been conceptualised as an actor **whose influence on the international arena is grounded on norms, rules, values and institutions that shape, through agenda-setting and structural and productive power, the environment within which other actors must navigate**. As REMIT researchers Thomas Christiansen and Flavia Lucenti point out in their research, in the realm of strategic technologies, the Union has relied heavily on this normative dimension of its power and should therefore be considered a relevant actor even if it does not punch in the same league as the US and China as a hub of technological innovation.<sup>14</sup> This includes the Union's attempts to ensure the rights of consumers in the digital space or creating a level playing field for companies. It also pertains to preventing the use technologies in a manner which is deemed unethical or harmful and in contravention to the liberal values that the Union and its member states espouse. Another side of the coin is the EU's continuing commitment to multilateral solutions, international legal frameworks and international cooperation on matters as wide-ranging as unfair trading practices, intellectual property theft, protection of individual privacy and the spread of misinformation. Interestingly, Haar and Yang raise a further component of normative power to the fore in their study on potential EU reactions to US-China competition in the tech space, namely the role that Europe could play by creating an alternative more cooperative narrative to contest the framing of the current age as a "new Cold War" between the two superpowers.<sup>15</sup>

In the context of strategic technology governance, REMIT researchers have placed considerable emphasis on **Artificial Intelligence** – one of the four technological fields deemed critical alongside advanced semiconductors, quantum computing and biotechnologies by the European Commission in October 2023.<sup>16</sup> When it comes to civilian AI, the AI Act presents the EU's first initiative aimed at regulating this technology in accordance with European rights and values.<sup>17</sup> Such regulatory efforts are seen as paramount, given the seemingly infinite possibilities as well as grave risks associated with AI. However, as Christiansen and Lucenti underline in their work, the EU AI Act will only become effective two years after its publication in the Official Journal, which risks rendering it obsolete as progress on AI continues apace. This possibly **circumscribes the Union's ability to act as a normative power in the AI space, leaving the EU at a potential disadvantage vis-à-vis the US and China**. Relatedly, as Creutz, Javadi, Onderco and Sinkkonen point out in their research, the EU AI Act has left military applications of AI outside its remit, creating a potentially critical omission from its risks-based approach to AI governance.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>13</sup> Bradford 2020; Duchêne 1973; Manners 2002.

<sup>14</sup> Lucenti and Christiansen 2024.

<sup>15</sup> Haar and Yang 2024.

<sup>16</sup> European Commission 2023a.

<sup>17</sup> Lucenti and Christiansen 2024.

<sup>18</sup> Creutz, Javadi, Onderco and Sinkkonen 2024.



However, the Union continues to take part in various initiatives related to military AI through its member states. Such initiatives include the Summit on Responsible Artificial Intelligence in the Military Domain (REAIM) and the “Political Declaration on Responsible Military Use of Artificial Intelligence and Autonomy” (the Political Declaration). As Onderco and Javadi argue in their study, both the REAIM and Political Declaration open opportunities for the Union to impact this emerging field of global governance. However, they argue that the REAIM – being less obviously linked to American attempts to contest China’s global influence, multistakeholder in nature, and arguably depoliticised and decentralised – presents the Union with a better opportunity to pursue an extensive coalition based on a consensual vision.<sup>19</sup> Yet, EU member states have not shied away from backing the Political Declaration,



Figure 1. Core principles underpinning the EU's efforts to enhance global regulation of military AI.

thus aligning with likeminded partner states. This division of views over which way to head seems to also be held within the broader military AI policy community. An Erasmus University Rotterdam survey, whose results are analysed by Creutz, Javadi, Onderco and Sinkkonen, for instance, does not lend much support for the proposition that the Union should opt to partner with the Global South over the United States in military AI governance (only 15.6% of respondents agree), but respondents remain almost evenly divided on whether the EU should assess partners based on their democratic credentials.<sup>20</sup> The same survey also points towards a vision that supports core EU/Western values. When requested to name key words or phrases that undergird an EU vision for governing military applications of AI, notions like ‘human control’, ‘transparency’, ‘accountability’, ‘human rights’ and ‘international humanitarian law’ received considerable support (Figure 1).

There is, therefore, a **potential ‘role strain’ emerging in the EU’s agency in the context of strategic technology governance.**<sup>21</sup> On the one hand, part of the Union’s **normative difference vis-à-vis the United States and China** remains its rights-based approach to AI and regulation of technology in general – a difference that could, as Lucenti and Christiansen suggest, contribute to amplifying the Union’s influence on the global stage.<sup>22</sup> On the other hand, EU policymakers are pushing for a **more geopolitical outlook for the Union in a world marked by intensifying strategic competition.**<sup>23</sup> The challenge is marrying these roles in a manner that allows for the EU to retain its actorness in the future. This is where the notion of strategic multilateralism comes into play.

<sup>19</sup> Onderco and Javadi 2024.

<sup>20</sup> Creutz, Javadi, Onderco and Sinkkonen 2024.

<sup>21</sup> Cf. Aggestam 2006.

<sup>22</sup> Lucenti and Christiansen 2024.

<sup>23</sup> Koenig 2019.



### 3.1.2. The EU as an Emerging Strategic Multilateralist

**In an age of strategic competition, multilateralism has increasingly become less an end in itself than a means to achieve certain strategic ends.** This is so even for an actor like the EU, which has for decades been conceptualised as a normative power and, in this respect, being a vanguard of the multilateral rules-based order has been built into its identity. The results of the survey analysed by Creutz, Javadi, Onderco and Sinkkonen, for instance, brings to the fore several options that the Union could follow to harness multilateralism and ensure European actorness and the pursuit of EU interests.<sup>24</sup> While the results capture the realm of AI governance, they have some generalisable potential. Respondents were essentially evenly divided on the use of bilateral frameworks (Figure 2), there was considerable (67.2 %) support for a new EU-led multilateral set-up (Figure 3), while a majority (59.5%) of respondents support the notion that the EU should prioritize the UN’s Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons




Figure 2. Responses to the statement “The EU should prioritize bilateralism to advance its efforts in globally regulating military AI”.

<sup>24</sup> Creutz, Javadi, Onderco and Sinkkonen 2024.



(CCW) to enhance global regulation of military AI. It is therefore the view of the expert community that **the Union should utilise a collection of frameworks: bi-, minilateral and global**. This means that established forums can be utilized without excluding ad hoc coalitions with like-minded partners.




Figure 3. Responses to the statement “The EU should establish a new multilateral set-up to advance its efforts in globally regulating military AI”.

The expert survey results therefore lend support for the **Union’s international role as a ‘strategic multilateralist’**. This means an increasing willingness to pick and choose between different fora to promote EU interests, and assuming a more pragmatic problem-solving-oriented approach.<sup>25</sup> As Lucenti and Christiansen point out, it is vital for the EU to keep the door open to cooperation with partners and to actively promote multilateral governance – not only to advance the respect for existing rules, but above all to envision new and more effective mechanisms to collaborate in shaping the future of technology globally.<sup>26</sup> However, there is one more relevant element to the story: the imperative to look inward and consider how the EU could bolster its ability to act in a world of strategic competition.

### 3.1.3. Industrial Strategies and Autonomy

EU decision-makers are increasingly coming to the realisation that the Union needs a more robust and self-sustaining industrial base.<sup>27</sup> Policies designed to achieve this are also being developed in the technology and innovation sector by engaging in various subsidy plans to support emerging industries of member states. This is a stark departure from the limited involvement that the EU Commission and national governments have traditionally had in providing financial support to such businesses.

Through financial incentives and a range of other mechanisms to promote the growth and competitiveness of strategic technological value chains (with a spotlight on critical areas like semiconductors, AI, quantum technologies and biotechnologies)<sup>28</sup> the aim will be to ensure the integration of national industries in the wider EU economy. This would make it possible to achieve greater economic cohesion within the EU and solidifying its position as a stronger player on the international stage. Beyond that, **these policies are also in line with the aim of achieving greater strategic autonomy**, which the EU has been seeking since at least 2016.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>25</sup> Helwig 2022.

<sup>26</sup> Lucenti and Christiansen 2024.

<sup>27</sup> Lucenti and Christiansen 2024.

<sup>28</sup> European Commission 2023b.

<sup>29</sup> Lucenti and Christiansen 2024; see also Helwig and Sinkkonen 2022.



Returning to the case of military AI illustrates the challenges of seeking autonomy, *ergo* actorness, in a novel technological arena. Next to numerous global constraints, the **EU also battles a limitation it is often criticised for: it is severely constrained in terms of formal powers to make decisions related to defence and security matters.**<sup>30</sup> There are nevertheless examples of EU member states having overcome this limitation by deciding to act together. The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) – one of the building blocks of EU defence policy – enables the rapprochement of the member states in defence capabilities, joint investments and operational readiness. The European Defence Fund (EDF) and its funding of research and development also testifies that Europe is an actor in military applications of AI. **Innovative use of the different toolboxes the EU has at its disposal is therefore vital, as the Union contributes to global technology governance in an age of strategic competition.**

### 3.2. Competing Coalitions and Technological Outlooks in US Foreign and Security Policy

**US leadership in the international arena has been undermined not only by the on-going power shift in the international system and erosion of the so-called liberal international order, but also by domestic political divides that have intensified over the past decade.** Some of the most serious divides play out in US society more broadly, but there have also been many instances of tensions between political institutions and even within presidential administrations. These have produced contentious decision-making in foreign policy. At the current time of division in US foreign policy, researchers have examined how different forms of contention have a major bearing on Washington’s outlooks on multilateralism and global technology governance, as well as relations with allies and especially adversaries.

#### 3.2.1. US Views on Relations with China: Challenges to Multilateral Engagement

Remit PI Roberta N. Haar has written on the policy shift that occurred during the Obama administration over US thinking on multilateralism employing the ACF, which provides an insightful lens for analysing the contentious debate on redefining US multilateral engagement.<sup>31</sup> Her research starts with a consideration of the evolution of US policy on multilateralism and a review of the US’ cyclical support of multilateralism versus isolationism, highlighting the role of domestic and economic factors and the influence of distinct advocacy coalitions that competed to shape policy. The ACF is a theoretical framework that can be used to capture the strategies, means and contexts that the *Pragmatic Realist* Coalition employed to persuade the president to adopt its less interventionist ideas, ultimately hardening many of them into official US policies vis-à-vis multilateral engagement in cases like the Libya (2011) intervention and the decision to not use military force in response to Bashar al-Assad’s use of chemical weapons against civilians in Syria (2013). This shift in US thinking on multilateralism in the Obama era foregrounds later changes that transpired during the Trump and Biden administrations.<sup>32</sup>

Haar and Sinkkonen’s on-going research on US foreign policy also utilised the ACF to examine the US debate on multilateralism with China.<sup>33</sup> **Differing policymaking coalitions contributing to US foreign policy have conflicting views on multilateralism relating to China.** These differing views lead to three coalitions vying for policy adoption: one arguing for continued engagement, believing that integration and collaboration can lead to shared benefits, improved global standards, and the diffusion of technological advancements. A second group wants to weaponize strategic technologies to gain advantages in the great power competition with a Communist China that is intent on subverting the U.S.-led liberal global order. The third coalition advocates a “flexilateral” approach,<sup>34</sup> to employ selective decoupling to limit technological interdependence and reduce reliance on Chinese critical supply chains. Thus, according to advocates of greater multilateralism involving China in US foreign policy, this can serve to manage intergovernmental conflicts, prevent dangerous escalation and promote peaceful resolution of disputes. Critics argue that China’s technological advancements in areas such as 5G,

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<sup>30</sup> Creutz, Javadi, Onderco and Sinkkonen 2024.

<sup>31</sup> Haar 2023.

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Sinkkonen and Kronlund 2023.

<sup>33</sup> Haar and Sinkkonen 2024.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. Faure 2018.



artificial intelligence, and cybersecurity create risks for US national security, emphasizing China's state-led industrial policies and practices as causing unfair economic competition. These policies and practices include subsidies, market access restrictions, and forced technology transfers. Flexilateralists and new isolationists also point to China's recent escalation in military assertiveness towards Taiwan, evidenced by military aircraft incursions into Taiwan's air defense identification zone, coupled with an intensification in rhetoric regarding Beijing's sovereignty claims over the island. Apprehensions about China's potential use of force to "reunify" have escalated along with worries about Asia's dominance in the \$600 billion chip sector industry.<sup>35</sup>

Haar and Yang's policy brief also delves into to these **tensions between coalitions favouring competition and those favouring engagement**.<sup>36</sup> Other than attempting to engage China on climate change and combating the pandemic, the **Biden administration maintained a stance toward China that aligns closely with the previous Trump administration**. This is especially the case concerning competitive strategic technologies such as 5G/6G, advanced semiconductors to handle the computational demands of AI, quantum computing, and electric vehicles (EVs). Additionally, president Biden initiated a \$2.25 trillion infrastructure plan, which, not unlike China's policy to increase domestic innovation and strength, allocated funds for sectors such as transportation, manufacturing, renewable energy, clean water, and high-speed broadband for both wired and wireless technologies. In the realm of biotech, the Biden administration has initiated a \$2 billion funding push to ensure US competitiveness,<sup>37</sup> while proposed legislation in Congress would target Chinese biotech companies by restricting their access to the US market.<sup>38</sup> The **justification for these investments, was that they were a response to Chinese Premier Xi Jinping's ambitious goals of doubling China's economy by 2035**, intending to establish China as a global leader in biotechnology, green energy, and AI.<sup>39</sup>

In addition to a spending strategy to boost US competitiveness in strategic technologies, the **Biden administration continued with some of Trump's punitive measures**. For example, Biden upheld tariffs amounting to approximately \$300 billion, and he continued action against Huawei, which is considered a national security risk by the US because of its links to the CCP, data harvesting capabilities, as well as inadequate cybersecurity.<sup>40</sup> The EU Commission has made a similar assessment.<sup>41</sup> The Trump administration used the Bureau of Industry and Security to exclude Huawei from global semiconductor supply chains and it placed the company on the Commerce Department's Entity List, thus requiring US companies to obtain a license before exporting to Huawei.<sup>42</sup> Biden also kept in place Trump-era prohibitions on sales of US goods to companies like Huawei, as well as maintaining restrictions on exports of US critical technology. In particular, the Biden administration's decision on 7 October 2022 to heavily restrict the export of advanced chips and chipmaking tools to China is a shift in gears: the US has moved from competing with China to a form of containment, trying to ensure Beijing will not catch up with Washington in critical technologies at any point in the future.<sup>43</sup> It subsequently tightened loopholes in the original restrictions in October 2023.<sup>44</sup> Another component of this strategy has been bringing US allies on board, as has occurred with the Dutch company ASML, which has halted exports of high-tech chipmaking machinery to China.

While multilateralists in the **Biden administration want to seek a more multilateral approach** toward global challenges like climate change and future pandemics, they cannot escape domestic pressures for a harder stance on trade and issues related to globalization.<sup>45</sup> Congress and public opinion are growing increasingly skeptical of doing business with China, which steals intellectual property, siphons off

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<sup>35</sup> United States Department of Defense. 2020.

<sup>36</sup> Haar and Yang 2024.

<sup>37</sup> White House 2022.

<sup>38</sup> The Select Committee on the CCP 2024.

<sup>39</sup> Haar and Yang 2024.

<sup>40</sup> Federal Communications Commission 2020.

<sup>41</sup> European Commission 2023c.

<sup>42</sup> Haar and Yang 2024.

<sup>43</sup> Sheehan 2022; Bateman 2022.

<sup>44</sup> Bureau of Industry and Security 2023.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid.



American manufacturing jobs and carries out espionage through spy balloons over U.S. critical infrastructure. Alongside “China Hawks” in the Biden administration and US government agencies, one key shaper of US attitudes towards China are the leaders of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, Republican Representative Mike Gallagher and Democratic Representative Raja Krishnamoorthi, who lead one of the last bastions of functioning bipartisanship in Washington, D.C. With their many investigations, subpoenas, and policy recommendations, **the House China Committee has become the “beating heart” of US Congressional policy, which, with regards to technology, argues for selectively decoupling from China for national security reasons.**

### 3.2.2. US Strategy and Technological Outlooks Going Forward

Not all US forays in strategic technology are explicitly framed in the context of or directly related to US-China competition. As Creutz, Javadi, Onderco and Sinkkonen argue in their paper, the **United States has received criticism for being reluctant to enter the AI regulatory game.**<sup>46</sup> To date, little progress has been made in Congress in the way of legislation: Capitol Hill has focused on maintaining the US edge in AI with a laissez-faire approach, and on steering government adoption of AI with guidelines. The Biden administration has taken executive action, that focuses on transparency, testing, as well as tools and standards, touching on risks like deepfakes and the use of AI to develop nuclear and biological weapons, as well as questions of privacy, civil rights, innovation, and responsible government use of AI. The US and the EU have also found limited common ground on AI governance. Their Trade and Technology Council (TTC), for instance, has distanced the two powers from the use of AI for social scoring systems, a practice employed in China and other authoritarian states.

However, the **American drive for governance of AI applications in the military domain has been more prominent.** In addition to the above-mentioned Political Declaration, the US has considered it necessary to move beyond the UN and its prevalent focus on weapons systems under the CCW.<sup>47</sup> One such forum has been NATO, which has encouraged the development of guidelines for military AI, structured around three key pillars: (1) ethics and values, (2) legal norms, and (3) safety and security. Stemming from its AI Strategy of 2021, NATO has established procedures and competence to operationalize AI governance through standardization and policy planning.

As the leading military power in the world, **the US is naturally at the foreground of developments in the use of new technologies in the military domain more broadly.** A pivotal shift has also occurred within the US Cyber Command’s strategic approach since 2018, transitioning from a deterrence orientation to one of persistent engagement. US strategic change involves the proactive disruption of adversarial cyber operations across the world.<sup>48</sup> This transformative change is widely recognized as a fundamental alteration in cyber policy, carrying substantial ramifications for US interactions with both adversaries and allies within the cyber domain. Domestic coalitions spearheading this shift in policy are analysed in Max Smeets’ on-going research.

Comparable leaps are also occurring on the hardware side with advanced US security and defence technologies. McNamara examines the evolution of US military drone strikes and counterterrorism strategy.<sup>49</sup> US drone strikes were escalated for “targeted killing” to ease terrorist threats from Al-Qaeda and affiliated networks in Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere in the late 2010s. This has contributed to a loosening of universal ethics on these interventions. This creates global security conditions where such interventions become more common. The political threshold enabling force is reduced, although in a more surgical manner due to the military technology in use.

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<sup>46</sup> Creutz, Javadi, Onderco and Sinkkonen 2024.

<sup>47</sup> *ibid.*

<sup>48</sup> Smeets 2024.

<sup>49</sup> McNamara 2023.



### 3.3. China's Awakening to Geopolitical Tech Competition

China is indisputably one of the powers that affect the development of technology and its governance the most, also from the standpoint of its rivalry with the United States. Relations between China and the US, and increasingly China and the EU, have grown more tense and competitive across the board in recent years.<sup>50</sup> The qualms of the West with respect to China's embrace of a geoeconomic approach include criticisms of unfair trading practices, its elaborate use of state subsidies to skew competition, the restrictions Beijing has placed on market access and investment for foreign companies, as well as the regime's coercive economic actions, including boycotts on goods and restrictions on the exports of raw materials.<sup>51</sup> At the same time, China has grown increasingly assertive in its near abroad, especially with respect to Taiwan and the South China Sea, and more authoritarian at home. China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been widely criticised for creating debt dependencies and undermining development and being a reflection of its geostrategic ambitions.<sup>52</sup> In recent years, **China has also pursued an active policy to expand its international influence through the setting up of institutions and rule-shaping,<sup>53</sup> which has extended to global technological standards.** Beijing's actions at home, such as the drive to achieve self-sufficiency in key tech sectors and the push for domestic innovation also indicate that it views technology as a central arena in a competitive relationship with the West.<sup>54</sup> Hence understanding China's role is central to examining the geopolitics of technology governance.

#### 3.3.1. Rethinking Relations with the US and the West

According to research conducted by Haar and Yang,<sup>55</sup> during Xi Jinping's first term, the Chinese government still positioned technology under the economic-oriented strategy of *innovation-driven development*, a stance that followed the idea that "science and technology constitute a primary productive force" and the "peaceful development" principles set during Deng Xiaoping's era. However, China's subsequent policy shift with respect to strategic technologies has entailed a hybrid strategy that was already in place for key "chokepoint" technologies, where China was reliant on supplies from the US and the broader West. This toolbox has included, for instance, "favorable industrial policies for domestic manufacturers, home-grown innovation, efforts to copy or imitate foreign technology, and acquisition of foreign suppliers".<sup>56</sup>

Recently, much attention has been given to the 7 October 2022 decision by the US administration to cut off Chinese access to advanced semiconductors. However, two earlier sanctions incidents targeting Chinese telecommunications giants had already reinforced Chinese leaders' strategic thinking about its geopolitical technology competition with the US. One related to ZTE, China's second-largest communications equipment manufacturer, which was accused of and sanctioned for selling telecom equipment containing American chip technology to Iran, in violation of US sanctions;<sup>57</sup> the second involved Meng Wanzhou, then Vice-Chairwoman and CFO of the Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei, who was arrested in Vancouver, Canada, during a layover in December 2018. Consequently, China's policy in relation to global tech governance embarked upon a dual track: 1) switching mode from reassurance to deterrence and economic coercion; and 2) seeking more regulatory power.<sup>58</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Sinkkonen and Sinkkonen 2021.

<sup>51</sup> Delisle and Goldstein 2021.

<sup>52</sup> Li 2020, 183–185.

<sup>53</sup> Creutz 2023a; b.

<sup>54</sup> Engelke and Weinstein 2023.

<sup>55</sup> Haar and Yang 2024.

<sup>56</sup> Murphy 2022, 17.

<sup>57</sup> Allen 2023, 3–7.

<sup>58</sup> Haar and Yang 2024.





### 3.3.2. From Reassurance to Deterrence and Economic Coercion

Official Chinese discourse presents its geo-technological competition with the U.S. as novel and passively learned.<sup>59</sup> The ZTE and Meng Wanzhou incidents generated not only a surge in Chinese public patriotic sentiment but triggered concern about China's strategic technology companies among senior Chinese officials. As a result, the 14<sup>th</sup> *Five-Year Plan* issued by the CCP in 2020 proposed "making technological self-reliance" a strategic goal. Soon all official documents established a new tone for **China's technology strategy based on self-reliance** setting a marked shift in approach from China's previous reassurance strategy that had entailed showing selective goodwill towards the US and certain components of the international order dominated by it.<sup>60</sup>

The Xi Jinping government chose to **show strength and use countermeasures to reduce the likelihood of further US trade or coercive action**.<sup>61</sup> To make this **deterrence strategy** work, however, Xi further believed China needed to gain strong capacity in key tech fields. Therefore, Xi first mobilized domestic R&D resources and tried to acquire advanced technologies *before* using diplomatic countermeasures. A typical example of this strategy in play concerns the semiconductor industry. Facing export controls on semiconductor equipment from the US, the Netherlands, and Japan, the Chinese government first **increased R&D investment** in the sector, trying to overcome "chokepoint" technologies.<sup>62</sup> As a result, China's investment in semiconductor R&D grew from \$10 billion in 2018 to \$25 billion in 2022, an increase of 150%. At the same time, the Chinese government increased **investment in the production of key raw materials** (silicon, gallium nitride, etc.) and semiconductor production bases. It also guided industries upstream while at the same time pushing for downstream integration through policies to improve and strengthen supply chain security.

At the same time as it made these investments, China's policies assumed more coercive overtones in keeping with a more offensive economic approach whose existence has been long pointed to by its critics.<sup>63</sup> For instance, Beijing moved to **increase international supply chain dependence on China** through its comparative advantages in the semiconductor industry (and even other industries) in a hedging move against perceived aggressive actions by the US and its allies.<sup>64</sup> In the automotive chip sector, in the supply of vital raw materials, and in the semiconductor equipment markets, China sought to utilize its significant comparative advantages. In August 2023, the Chinese government announced **export controls** on gallium and germanium, two key materials for manufacturing semiconductors. China has also relied on other methods, such as **attempts to evade export restrictions** through illicit means, putting **pressure on US allies diplomatically, acquiring technological know-how through espionage** and recruiting talent, and **targeting US companies operating in China**.<sup>65</sup>

### 3.3.3. From Rule-taker to Rule-shaper

Besides responding to what was perceived by Chinese policymakers as US containment policies in technology, China's strategic use of technology followed yet another approach, one led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT). This route envisaged **seeking more regulatory power**, for example, in the areas of civilian AI where China has huge potential.<sup>66</sup> Starting in 2018, the Chinese government showed a strong determination to introduce and study AI ethics and technical standards.<sup>67</sup> Based on these domestic framework policies, various diplomatic initiatives, and standards proposals, the MFA and MIIT expanded China's regulatory influence in the field of AI. For example, the MFA proposed the "Global Data Security Initiative" in 2020 and the "Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative" in 2023. Minister Wang Yi explicitly stated, "We

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Johnston 2019.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> See e.g. Economy 2022; Doshi 2021.

<sup>64</sup> Haar and Yang 2024.

<sup>65</sup> Allen 2023, 14–20.

<sup>66</sup> Cheng and Zeng 2023.

<sup>67</sup> See, inter alia, China Electronics Standardization Institute 2018.



hope to provide a blueprint for related international discussions and rule-making.” The China Electronics Standardization Institute, affiliated with the MIIT, also actively participates in the formulation of new international technology standards.

### 3.3.4. Zooming in on Bio and Health Tech: China’s Vaccine Diplomacy

When it comes to geopolitics and bio and health tech, vaccine diplomacy with the mRNA Covid vaccines provides a timely study on how major powers, such as China, utilize technology to leverage power in the neighbourhood and among potential partner countries. The effectiveness of Chinese vaccine diplomacy in the Philippines and Vietnam was studied by UM researcher Catherine Lo and Remco Johan Leonard van Dijk.<sup>68</sup> Both countries are key trading partners of China in the region, but they have been the most vocal in expressing their concerns over growing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea (SCS). The SCS has periodically flared up for the last twenty years due to regional governance and security challenges. Considering that bilateral and multilateral efforts to resolve the conflict have all failed, it is salient to understand **whether vaccine diplomacy could be a viable solution to de-escalate potential military conflicts between China and the claimants**. Focusing on two key claimants in the SCS, the Philippines and Vietnam, the study has the following research question: How effective was Chinese COVID-19 vaccine diplomacy in the Philippines and Vietnam from a soft power perspective?

Through a qualitative multiple case study research design, the authors determined the effectiveness of Chinese vaccine diplomacy in the Philippines and Vietnam by using four indicators of soft power: public opinion, foreign policy, attractiveness, and business and trade. Data collection consisted of a literature search of academic literature and newspaper articles that were published between 26 May and 13 June 2022. A thematic analysis was conducted to analyse the data. The results show that only the indicators of attractiveness in Vietnam and business and trade in the Philippines have somewhat improved. In contrast, the indicators of public opinion and foreign policy showed neutral or negative results for China. The study concludes that **Chinese vaccine diplomacy in the Philippines and Vietnam during the COVID-19 pandemic was unsuccessful from a soft power perspective**. One reason is that China undermined its soft power approach by simultaneously using hard power tactics in Southeast Asia.<sup>69</sup>

### 3.4. Discussion: A Strategic Multilateralism for a Geopolitical Age

The above discussion illustrates the challenges facing the European Union in the governance of strategic technologies space in an age of competition: US-China rivalries in technological affairs are intensified by broader geopolitical deterioration. Situated behind the US and China as the two leading technological powers, it is vital for EU to craft a response to the rivalry between Washington and Beijing if it is to retain a prominent role exerting influence in global technological affairs. However, it is becoming increasingly evident that this is difficult to do by merely relying on the Union’s normative power. **For both the US and China, multilateralism has increasingly become less an end in itself than a means to achieve certain strategic ends**. In the case of military AI, for instance, the US has pursued the Political Declaration to push its preferred understandings. China, in turn, hopes that its “Global Data Security Initiative” and the “Global Artificial Intelligence Governance Initiative” proliferate as blueprints in the global governance space. There may be a Brussels Effect, but it should not be forgotten that there is also a **Washington and Beijing effect, both backed by considerable material endowments and innovative potential**.

Moreover, both the US and China have illustrated their willingness to use **trade and export restrictions** to get ahead in the competition over strategic technologies. Such forays may, however, be detrimental to both American and Chinese influence globally, both in terms of undercutting the ability to ‘weaponize interdependence’ as connections are severed, as well as in the context of ‘soft’ or ‘normative power’ as others feel the brunt of their coercive actions. In the case of the US, this issue would be further exacerbated if Donald Trump were to succeed in his bid to return to the White House. While Trump’s first term as President was marked by a transactionalist and unilateral approach to US global engagement, there is a distinct possibility that his second term would be even more detrimental to

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<sup>68</sup> van Dijk and Lo 2023.

<sup>69</sup> See also Gill 2020.



multilateral institutions and international cooperation, grounded on a zero-sum, transactionalist and even isolationist reading of the international arena, whether in the realm of strategic technologies or more broadly in areas like climate action, pandemic preparedness and alliance management.

All this makes it essential for the EU to assume a multi-pronged approach. **Multilateral policymaking is central to the EU's *raison d'être*** – also per the treaties –<sup>70</sup> **but the Union must also be more vigilant in balancing its partnerships in strategic technologies while ensuring their ethical use.** Moreover, in an era of persistent global crises, preserving autonomy at a minimum level is desirable, if the pursuit of this goal does not fundamentally undermine the future of a globalised and interconnected economy. The findings of the REMIT researchers on the Union's role in the governance of strategic technologies in the context of US-China competition therefore point to a conundrum that the EU will be forced to deal with in the coming years. **The Union will be faced with difficult choices between pursuing its more traditional “normative power” approach to international affairs and assuming a geopolitical understanding of the Union's role in the world. Committing to strategic multilateralism, by prioritising bi-, mini-, and multilateral as well as multistakeholder fora that are conducive to the pursuit of the EU's values and interests, is a potential way for the EU to cope with this ‘role strain’ and retain actorness in the process.** In the meantime, the Union cannot rest on its laurels internally – the need to build capacity in strategic technologies is imperative in meeting the challenges of a more cutthroat international environment. In short, the Union needs to be willing to act like a prudent great power in line with its latent power capabilities.

## 4. Next Steps

Next to finalising the tasks of the first 12 months of the project, researchers are shifting focus to deliver on future WP4 research tasks, both those in 2024 but also in forthcoming project years. This entails proceeding from the results of Task 4.1 and especially its analyses of networks to exploring policy subsystems by mapping concrete coalitions and their beliefs in line with the ACF. The results will be presented in academic publications, to which the two planned special issues will provide publishing forums of highest academic quality and impact. The parallel work that has been conducted will indeed amplify the knowledge produced by WP4 on a broader range of strategic technologies, coalition-forming, EU's strategies vis-à-vis US and China, as well as multilateral forums. The academic work will then be translated into policy recommendations and ultimately scenario testing workshops that will be organised both on site and online in 2026.

The immediate next steps include:

1) preparations for **research and related dissemination** activities, i.e. policy briefs, town hall events/debate cafés, international conferences, side events, op-eds, academic journal articles, dashboards. These include, for instance:

- Town hall event in Rotterdam with students, 17 April 2024
- Side event in connection to the 3<sup>rd</sup> annual Helsinki Security Forum, September 2024

2) work on the **special issues** of *Geopolitics* and *International Studies Review*;

3) **International Studies Association Conference** in San Francisco, 3-6 April 2024, with upcoming panel and side-event relating to the special issue to *Geopolitics*;

4) **Annual Conference** in Leuven 16-17 May 2024 with WP4 researchers responsible for the parallel session entitled “Strategic Technologies: Governance and Advocacy”, and a panel exploring the complexities associated with “The Dynamics of Multilateral Approaches in the Context of the Two Wars in the Geopolitical Neighbourhoods of the European Union”.

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<sup>70</sup> Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union, OJ C 326, 26.10.2012, art 21.



## 5. Conclusions

Researchers in WP4 have made many contributions to meeting Task 4.1. through the state-of-the-art review either individually or jointly. This review investigated the **evolution in geopolitical stances formed by the EU, US and China in global technology governance**. A comparative emphasis was undertaken with many scholarly and analytic components covered. Researchers employed a **mix of normative and empirical methodologies for data-gathering**. This included systematic literature reviews, interviews and consultations, survey research, quantitative content analysis and social network analysis. **Quantitative content analysis** was carried out with structural coding linked to ACF application. Coding was assisted by the *LexisNexis* database. This made initial identification of ACFs shaping US, EU and Chinese technology policy more comprehensive and precise although admittedly this is still a work in progress. **Survey research** sought expert opinions on the EU's preferences and involvement in regulating global military AI. It focused on state-level data on stakeholders and actors for the EU to consider, and the global frameworks through which cooperation might take place. The various research efforts by WP4 have resulted in **scholarly papers, some of which have already been presented at prominent international conferences**. Some papers are currently going through the publication process (submission, peer-review, etc.) and some are now published. Several policy briefs were also produced targeting both policymakers within the Union, Member States, as well as the public. A series of further publications, especially academic ones, are in preparation and will be realized over REMIT's subsequent years. In building knowledge for the state-of-the-art review, the research was supported by a series of meetings, events and workshops, held both in-person and online over REMIT's initial 12 months. Communication of on-going WP4 research activities happened through a **variety of outreach events engaging with policymakers, university students and the public throughout Europe**.

While the vast part of the envisaged Task 4.1. has been fully realized, some **modifications** have taken place. The planned individual-level SNA had to be adapted into EU Member State-level analysis to accommodate the research results. This work will be carried out in the second half of 2024. The WP4 work on visualization of research findings into dashboards or monitors is also still on-going, as a strategy was needed with respect to what kind of data to visualize and through which software. The visualization work is being assisted through the activities of WP6, and the first WP4 dashboards/monitors should appear in Spring 2024.

When summarizing the WP4 state-of-the-art review, a fragmented picture emerges on global prospects for stronger multilateralism in tech governance. **The EU is arguably the actor with the most interests to see a stronger multilateral regime emerge**. It possesses normative power in the tech sphere and more broadly, a factor that many governments in the West and beyond perceive as compelling. However, the EU's technological base is not quite at the same level as the US and China, potentially impeding its ability to shape global governance in this area. EU regulatory frameworks also have some blind spots in important sectors for global security, such as military AI. **US-China rivalries currently override stronger multilateralism for global tech**. Both are intent to advance in AI, 5G/6G, security and defence tech, as well as health and biotech as platforms for pursuing their great-power interests. As a rising power, China is determined to establish itself as a global rule-maker and not a rule-taker in this area, but many of China's aims will not be accepted by the EU and the US. Washington, moreover, remains indecisive in how to manage relations with Beijing, as divisions in its political system and wider society dominate this question. These cleavages in American politics also have implications for US allies and partners. It appears crucial that the **EU must be willing to utilise a more strategic approach to its multilateral engagement with respect to strategic technologies to cope with the challenges posed by US-China strategic competition, the volatility of American domestic politics, China's assertiveness in its near abroad, as well as Washington and Beijing's positions vis-à-vis, for instance, the on-going Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and the Israel-Gaza War**. This will leave many open questions regarding multilateralism and the geopolitics of strategic technologies to be analysed in the coming years for WP4 and the wider REMIT consortium.



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## Annex 1: List of WP4 Activities

### Policy briefs

McNamara, Eoin Micheál (2023) "Nuclear arms control policies and safety in artificial intelligence: Transferable lessons or false equivalence?" *FIIA Briefing Paper* 381, The Finnish Institute of International Affairs. <https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/nuclear-arms-control-policies-and-safety-in-artificial-intelligence>.

Naumescu, Valentin (2024) "The Global Actors and the Black Sea's Geopolitics in the Context of the War in Ukraine." *Policy Brief* 1/2024, The EUXGLOB Centre. <https://euxglob.ro/wp-content/uploads/2024/01/Policy-Brief-1.pdf>.

Lucenti, Flavia and Christiansen, Thomas (2024) "Geopolitical Rivalry and the Regulation of Strategic Technologies: What Role for the European Union?" *Comment*, 22 January 2024, Italian Institute for International Political Studies. <https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/geopolitical-rivalry-and-the-regulation-of-strategic-technologies-what-role-for-the-european-union-161044>.

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Haar, Roberta N. and Yang, Hengyi (2024) "What should Europeans do about the U.S.-China Rivalry in key strategic technologies?" *Atlantisch Perspectief*, Atlantic Association.

### Opinion pieces

McNamara, Eoin Micheál (2023) "Finland's Hard Road to NATO." *DCU Brexit Institute*. <https://dcubrexitinstitute.eu/2023/05/finlands-long-road-to-nato/>.





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## Monitors & dashboards

UM (forthcoming) “The effectiveness of Chinese vaccine diplomacy in the Philippines and Vietnam.”

FIIA (forthcoming) “Regulation of Military AI.”

UBB (forthcoming) “Geopolitics and the Impact of the New Technologies in the Black Sea Region.” <https://public.tableau.com/app/profile/florina.caloianu/vizzes>.

## Townhall/Debate cafes

“Geopolitics and the Impact of the New Technologies in the Black Sea Region.” Babeş-Bolyai University Cluj, 9 November 2023. <https://euxglob.ro/euxglob-iii-international-conference-perspectives-of-the-eus-eastern-neighbourhood/>.

“Governing Military AI in competitive times: Options for the EU.” The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 24 January 2024. <https://www.fiia.fi/en/event/governing-military-ai-in-competitive-times-options-for-the-eu>.

“Multilateralism and the Transatlantic Relationship.” Maastricht University and Studio Europa Maastricht, 29 February 2024.

## Academic journal articles

van Dijk, Remco Johan Leonard and Yuk-ping Lo, Catherine (2023) “The effect of Chinese vaccine diplomacy during COVID-19 in the Philippines and Vietnam: A multiple case study from a soft power perspective.” *Humanities and Social Sciences Communications* 10(687): 1-12. <https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-023-02073-3>.

## Conference attendance

Netherlands Institute of Governance (NIG) Annual Work Conference. Conference Panel: “Challenges to multilateralism and the liberal international order.” Organised by Roberta N. Haar (UM) and Wolfgang Wagner (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam), 2 November 2023. <https://www.nigovernance.nl/conference-2023/>. Conference papers presented by REMIT WP4 partners:

- Haar, Roberta N. “Employing the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to explain Obama’s shift in his policy of Multilateralism.”
- Onderco, Michal, Vanhoonacker, Sophie & Javadi, Mahmoud “The European Union’s Emerging Actorship in Global Military AI Governance.”

The European International Studies Association’s 16<sup>th</sup> Pan-European Conference (EISA-PEC). Standing Section ST-18: Contestation in International Politics. Co-chair: Flavia Lucenti (LUISS), 7 September 2023. <https://pec2023.eisa-net.org/>.

The European International Studies Association’s 16<sup>th</sup> Pan-European Conference (EISA-PEC). Section ST-18: Contestation in International Politics. TB-ST18 Roundtable: Contestation in Prism. Patterns of norm



evolution, consolidation, and decay. Chair: Flavia Lucenti (LUISS), 7 September 2023. <https://pec2023.eisa-net.org/>.

The European International Studies Association's 16<sup>th</sup> Pan-European Conference (EISA-PEC). Standing Section ST-13: Science, Technology and Security. Panel: "AI, Machine Learning and New Security Practices." Chair: Fabio Cristiano (Utrecht University), 7 September 2023. <https://pec2023.eisa-net.org/>. Conference Paper presented by REMIT WP4 partner:

- McNamara, E. "Military Drones and Technological Transformation in US Counter-Terrorism Strategy: What Backlashes for Global Security Order?"

36th Annual Conference of the Italian Political Science Association (SISP). Conference Panel: "Differentiation in EU Foreign Policy." Chair: Maria Giulia Amadio Viceré (Robert Schuman Centre), 16 September 2023. <https://www.sisp.it/convegno2023/?pagename=progman&pubblica=true&tutto=true>. Conference paper presented by REMIT WP4 partners:

- Lucenti, F. & Christiansen, T. "The Governance of Strategic Technologies: Between Geopolitical Competition and Multilateral Cooperation"

## Other events

"Research workshop: The Geopolitics of Strategic Technology Governance." Luiss University, 22 November 2023.

"Sino-American Competition and European Strategic Autonomy" -workshop. Brussels School of Governance, 24 October 2023. [https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sino-american-competition-european-strategic-autonomy-csds-brussels-oe4pe/?utm\\_source=rss&utm\\_campaign=articles\\_sitemaps](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/sino-american-competition-european-strategic-autonomy-csds-brussels-oe4pe/?utm_source=rss&utm_campaign=articles_sitemaps). Participation in the panel "China and European Strategic Autonomy" by Thomas Christiansen.

